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Abstract 
This article explores recent developments within the U.K. drug market: that is, the commuting of 
gang members from major cities to small rural urban areas for the purpose of enhancing their profit 
from drug distribution. Such practice has come to be known as working “County Lines.” We present 
findings drawn from qualitative research with practitioners working to address serious and 
organized crime and participants involved in street gangs and illicit drug supply in both Glasgow and 
Merseyside, United Kingdom. We find evidence of Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE) in County Lines 
activity, often as a result of debt bondage; but also, cases of young people working the lines of their 
own volition to obtain financial and status rewards. In conclusion, we put forward a series of 
recommendations which are aimed at informing police strategy, practitioner intervention, and wider 
governmental policy to effectively address this growing, and highly problematic, phenomenon. 
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In the United Kingdom, cities like Glasgow and Liverpool have a long history of being major hubs for 
illicit drug distribution. Drugs such as heroin and crack cocaine have long been trafficked to these 
major cities before being distributed across the whole country (National Crime Agency [NCA], 2018). 
Rising demand for such drugs in recent years has meant an increased number of drug dealers are 
found in these urban cities (Densley, McLean, Deuchar, & Harding, 2018). Research finds cities like 
Glasgow and Liverpool have been flooded with drug dealers, so much so that local drug markets 
have become heavily saturated (Hales & Hobbs, 2010); that is, the number of dealers is not 
commensurate with the number of users (Ruggiero, 2010). To overcome market saturation and 
maximise profits, drug gangs have begun travelling to rural areas—where drugs markets are less well 
established—to develop a new client base to sell to (Andell & Pitts, 2018; Windle & Briggs, 2015b). 
The NCA (2016) suggests that this so-called “County Lines” model of drug dealing is commonplace, 
with 71% of British police forces reporting “established” County Lines activity in their force 
boundaries and 12% reporting an “emerging picture.” 
County Lines drug dealing is a new and rapidly evolving illicit drug supply model which sees urban 
drug gangs cross police borders to courier heroin and crack cocaine to rural or coastal towns (HM 
Government, 2018). It offers a critical challenge to the existing illicit drug market research base 
because the exportation of illegal drugs into one or more importing areas blurs boundaries between 
national wholesale and local street dealing (Pearson & Hobbs, 2001; for a discussion, see Coomber & 
Moyle, 2018). More than a policing problem, County Lines also represent a public health problem in 
terms of harm to vulnerable populations. Child Criminal Exploitation (CCE) is strongly associated with 
County Lines because to mitigate risk to them- selves, criminal gangs use children as young as 12 as 
runners to transport and distribute drugs using dedicated mobile phone “lines” (HM Government, 
2018). Commercial drug dealers have long harnessed the labour of low-level drug runners as 
workers in local drug markets (May & Hough, 2004; Preble & Casey, 1969). However, it is the active 
targeting of children and vulnerable adults and their systematic exploitation through debt bondage, 
“coercion, intimidation, violence (including sexual violence) and weapons” (HM Government, 2018, 
p. 48), that potentially separates county lines from traditional forms of drug dealing. 
This article aims to contribute to exploring this phenomenon, of which little is known beyond 
government threat assessments and journalistic accounts (Daly, 2017; NCA, 2015, 2016, 2017), by 
analysing findings from two qualitative studies of gangs con- ducted in Glasgow, Scotland, and 
Merseyside, England. What little academic knowledge there is of County Lines and CCE has largely 
emerged from in and around London where gangs are said to be more organised and hierarchically 
structured (see Densley, 2012; Harding, 2014; Storrod & Densley, 2017). The current article moves 
beyond focusing on the issue in the South of England (e.g., Andell & Pitts, 2018; Coomber & Moyle, 
2018; Windle & Briggs, 2015b) to exploring the issue in areas thus far neglected in research. Rarely 
are voices of the young people involved in County Lines heard, but they are necessary for building a 
complete picture of the problem and how it can be addressed. To this end, we use the data to 
answer two research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: How is County Lines drug dealing organised? 
  
Research Question 2: What emotional, physical, and social harms do County Lines labourers 
experience, especially children and young people? 
 
Literature Review 
In a 2007 report, the Home Office indicated that there were 300 major importers into the United 
Kingdom, 3,000 wholesalers, and 70,000 street drug dealers (Matrix Knowledge Group, 2007, p. 2). 
While the overall prevalence of illicit drug use in Britain remains stable (Home Office, 2017), 
government data reveal an increased involvement of young people in different aspects of the illicit 
drug market in recent years. For example, convictions of young people aged 10 to 17 for Class A 
(e.g., heroin and crack cocaine) drug production and possession with intent to supply have increased 
by 77% between 2012 and 2016; three times the equivalent increase among adult offenders 
(Ministry of Justice, 2017). While some of these young people are “user dealers” (Moyle & Coomber, 
2015) or individual entrepreneurs working “solo” (Hales & Hobbs, 2010; Windle & Briggs, 2015a), 
many others are embedded within gangs and organized criminal networks (for a discussion of 
organized crime, see Von Lampe, 2016). 
The role of gangs in serious violence in Britain has been subject to fierce debate (e.g., Gunter, 2017; 
Hallsworth, 2013; Hallsworth & Young, 2008), but scholars have found relative consensus in the 
finding that gangs are involved in illicit drug markets (Aldridge, Measham, & Williams, 2011; Bennett 
& Holloway, 2004; Densley, 2013, 2014; Harding, 2014; McLean, 2018; McLean, Densley, & Deuchar, 
2018; McSweeney, Turnbull, & Hough, 2008; Pitts, 2008) and that “illicit drug markets can drive 
sudden shifts in serious violence” (HM Government, 2018, p. 21). Research in the UK has found that 
“being in a gang usually means being part of the drugs business” (Heale, 2012, p. 21) and that illegal 
drug markets were the “single most important theme in relation to the use of illegal firearms” 
(Hales, Lewis, & Silverstone, 2006, p. XIV). For this reason, gangs’ involvement in drug markets has 
become a new national priority (HM Government, 2018). 
“County Lines” is the latest term adopted by police and government agencies to describe the 
contemporary drug dealing practices of criminal gangs (HM Government, 2018; NCA, 2015, 2016, 
2017). Consistent with an evolving gang model (see Densley, 2014; McLean, 2018), and in 
acknowledgment of crowded markets (Windle & Briggs, 2015b), gangs send their representatives to 
locations outside of their metropolitan homes, a process colloquially known as going “out there” or 
“going country” (Hallworth, 2016; Storrod & Densley, 2017), to take over more lucrative drug 
markets and establish new customers to sell to (Andell & Pitts, 2018). To support their “com- 
muting” to provincial markets (Coomber & Moyle, 2018), moreover, gangs will take over the homes 
of vulnerable adults to use as a base of operation or “crack house” (Briggs, 2010)—a process known 
as “cuckooing” (Coomber & Moyle, 2018). 
County Lines have been linked with an increase in homicides involving known illicit drug dealers 
and/or users as victims and/or suspects, and with an increase in knife crime outside of the main 
metropolitan areas in Britain (for a discussion, see HM 
Government, 2018). One explanation is that grievances in illicit drug markets cannot be settled 
through legal channels (see Jacques & Allen, 2015), and infiltrating drug- selling gangs, schooled in 
the global cities, are much more violent than the parochial career drug dealers who had controlled 
the market previously (Coomber & Moyle, 2018). Beyond the violence, an increasing number of 
children and young people have been picked up by the police in areas hundreds of miles from their 
homes (NCA, 2017), and even when unauthorized absences from home and school were brief, they 
represented a serious safeguarding concern (Sturrock & Holmes, 2015). Such is the gravity of the use 
of children in County Lines that media reports describe working the lines as the “new grooming 
scandal”, hot on the heels of the Rotherham Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) catastrophe (Davenport, 
2017). HM Government (2018) reports, “Once caught up in county lines, exploited individuals are at 
risk of extreme physical and/or sexual violence, gang recriminations and trafficking” (p. 8). 
Like with CSE, CCE involves an element of grooming; however, little published research exists on the 
relationship between perpetrator and victim (see Firmin, 2018). 
HM Government (2018, p. 8) explains that CCE 
occurs where an individual or group takes advantage of an imbalance of power to coerce, control, 
manipulate or deceive a child or young person under the age of 18 into any criminal activity (a) in 
exchange for something the victim needs or wants, and/or (b) for the financial or other advantage of 
the perpetrator or facilitator and/or (c) through violence or the threat of violence. The victim may 
have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual. 
 
Research has found that CCE does not necessarily involve physical contact, but rather can occur 
through online “remote mothering and online collateral” on smart phones and social media (Storrod 
& Densley, 2017, p. 687). As first described by Densley (2014, p. 533), one unique aspect of County 
Lines is the use of a branded mobile phone “line” established in the market, to which drugs orders 
are placed by introduced customers. The line is commonly (but not exclusively) controlled by a third-
party remote from the market, such an “elder” gang member, who, in turn, supervises his or her 
own “downline” of direct-sales people. 
Beyond “street capital” or status rewards (Harding, 2014), criminally exploited youth allegedly 
receive tangible rewards for working County Lines, such as money, alcohol, drugs, and 
accommodation (Knowsley Safeguarding Children’s Board, 2017). However, affection and social 
significance alone often are sufficient to keep vulnerable youth enticed into the criminal lifestyle 
because gang membership provides the familiarity of family structure and represents an achievable 
form of success for young people who might be segregated from mainstream cultural and 
institutional life by virtue of age, class, race, or community (Sharkey, Shekhtmeyster, Lopez, Norris, 
& Sass, 2011). Current discourses surrounding the exploiters and exploited involved in County Lines 
portray a helpless victim that has been forced against his or her will into a life of criminality by a 
ruthless, violent gang member (NCA, 2015); the current research aims in part to learn whether this 
depiction is accurate. 
HM Government (2016, 2018) has made tackling County Lines a national priority, but there exists 
little knowledge about its operation outside of London and the English South Coast. Furthermore, 
we know little about who the actors in this world are, especially those who do not fit neatly into 
either victim or perpetrator categories, such as the drug runners who take part in out-of-town drug 
dealing through their own volition. Prevailing discourses around County Lines imply that young 
people are determined to act by a gang structure that produces them as subjects without agency. 
The current study gives voice to the youth involved in County Lines at multiple levels, including some 
that have been criminally exploited and others who do the exploiting. This article explores the many 
nuanced issues surrounding the County Lines phenomena and attempts to paint a clear picture 
gathered from those involved, including practitioners tasked with addressing the issue. 
 
Method 
The data presented are taken from two independent studies, occurring at two different sites: (a) 
Glasgow, Scotland, and the surrounding conurbation; and (b) the Merseyside boroughs of Liverpool 
and Sefton in England. The Scottish participants were initially part of a larger study investigating the 
relationship between street gangs and organised crime (OC; led by McLean). Participants from the 
England site were part of a 3-year study into gangs and CCE (led by Robinson). We recognise that the 
term gang is con- tested (Hallsworth & Young, 2008), which when combined with the logistical 
challenges of multisite research, makes comparative research on “gangs” difficult (Klein, 2005). 
However, the “consensus Eurogang definition” of durable and street-orientated youth groups whose 
involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity (Klein & Maxson, 2006, p. 4) was 
designed for such purposes and is sufficiently general to capture the essence of the groups described 
herein. 
Furthermore, both studies were theoretically and methodologically similar enough to warrant a 
comparative analysis (for a discussion, see Van Hellemont & Densley, 2018). Both studies were 
granted ethical approval by the researcher’s respective universities, and informed consent was 
obtained from each participant. Participant names printed here are pseudonyms. Both studies were 
qualitative by design and as a result, emergent themes from thematic analysis shed considerable 
light on myriad issues pertaining to drug distribution, including the practice of working County Lines. 
Glasgow 
The second author gathered primary data between 2013 and 2016 as part of a qualitative inquiry 
focusing on the relationship between gang organisation and gang activity. Scotland’s largest city, 
Glasgow, has a long history of gang-related crime (Davies, 2013; Deuchar, 2009; Fraser, 2015). The 
larger Glasgow conurbation retains around 70% of Scotland’s organized criminal activity: 65% being 
directly related to the illegal supply of narcotics (Scottish Government, 2015, p. 6). Thus, it proved 
ideal for exploring gangs’ involvement in County Lines. Participant criteria were set as (a) having 
engaged in regular group offending, (b) having been involved in activities identified by Police 
Scotland (2016) as organized crime, and (c) be over 16 years of age. Participants were accessed 
initially via street workers attached to key outreach projects and a snowball sampling technique 
thereafter. In total, 42 (ex)offenders aged between 16 and 35 were interviewed, plus five 
practitioners. 
During interviews, great effort was undertaken to deploy a semistructured interview schedule that 
would allow the researcher to be responsive to emerging insights. Extracts chosen illustrate 
interviewees’ personal construction of reality through their own voices. Multiple interviews were 
scheduled with participants whenever possible, ranging between one to five, typically lasting 1 hr. 
Although most interviews were conducted on a one-on-one basis, three group interviews were held 
with groups of three, four, and five participants. All interviews were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. Data were triangulated whenever possible-typically with youth workers or other 
interviewees. 
 
Merseyside 
Data were gathered during 2017 and 2018 as part of a Merseyside case study into gangs and CCE. 
Made up of five boroughs, Merseyside is home to Liverpool, Sefton, Knowsley, St. Helens, and 
Wirral. The research was primarily conducted in Liverpool and Sefton, where gangs and organised 
criminal groups are shown to be the most prevalent. Like Glasgow, Liverpool is well known for gang 
activity and drug supply, standing as one of the national drug supply hubs (NCA, 2016) and, outside 
London, has been identified as Britain’s centre for organized crime (Heale, 2012), and second highest 
exporter of drugs and young people (NCA, 2017). Adding to the growing concerns of practitioners 
across Merseyside in relation to the age of young people becoming known to services such as Youth 
Offending Teams (YOT, to supervise young people who have been ordered by the court to serve 
sentences in the community or in custody) was a stark increase in gun crime and gang-related issues, 
respectively. Between April 2016 and April 2017, the Liverpool Echo (Merseyside’s daily newspaper) 
reported 89 shootings in Merseyside, a rise of 50% from the previous year, with many victims below 
the age of 18 (Thomas, 2017). While CCE has, until now, largely remained ignored, the latter half of 
2017 gave rise to the newly emerging social and criminal justice issue in the media, accompanied by 
discourse surrounding newly termed gang processes such as “County Lines” and “Cuckooing.” In the 
absence of academic literature outlining these processes, the current study was necessary. 
Semistructured interviews were conducted with 26 practitioners working with gang-involved young 
people across Merseyside including: Police, YOT, health professionals, intervention workers, and 
Safer Community Partnerships. Interviews typically lasted for around 60 min. Additional interviews 
were conducted with seven gang- involved young people, and one focus group was held with five 
other gang-involved young people, all of whom were over the age of 14 (mean age = 15), accessed 
via gatekeepers, and using either alternative education providers or YOT services. In total, 38 
individuals participated in the research. Interviews were performed on a one-to-one basis and either 
recorded via audio devices or in note form (to reassure and secure a level of trust and respect to the 
young people who feared repercussions of being identified). 
 
Findings 
Data from both sites were coded and analysed thematically (Creswell, 1994). These emergent 
themes are outlined below as “Going Country,” “Working the Lines,” and “Exploitation.” 
 
Going Country 
As discussed, complex processes apropos cultural, political, and socioeconomic globalisation have 
resulted in changes to the U.K. drug market (for a discussion, see Pitts, 2008) and, in some localities, 
their complete saturation (Hales & Hobbs, 2010). Practitioner John states, 
Years back, most the guys I knew would drink, some would smoke cannabis now and then. We just 
thought they were hippies, know . . . the 80s seen a big drug epidemic know. Heroin mostly . . . 
resulted in the [paisley] drug wars here. Basically, drugs took off and were flooding the streets. A 
few big dealers fought it out for control of the market in Fergsulie Park. . . . [at present it is] even 
worse now. Every second street has a dealer or two. (John, Glasgow) 
Such changes had local consequences, whereby resident “hardmen” sought opportunities in the 
drugs trade, resulting in “drug wars.” However, as John points out, the U.K. drug market continued 
to grow to the extent that it became impossible for a single drug dealer or any one drug gang to 
monopolize or “govern” drug markets (Campana & Varese, 2018; McLean, Deuchar, Harding, & 
Densley, 2018). Instead, local drug dealers began to commute to other, less saturated markets, to 
avoid competition altogether: 
 
[Glasgow area X] is bad, heavy dodgy [people] get attacked, it happens all the time. It’s just one of 
them risks way doing this type of shit [here]. . . . I moved here [to rural village] to get away from it 
all, too wild [in Glasgow]. Hassle from everyone. . . . It is shite [here in village] . . . [at] least here 
there is only really myself and a few others that do what I do. One other boy from Glasgow, spoke to 
him a few times but keep my distance really, guys no right. (Marie, Glasgow) 
 
Drug dealers commute owing to too much competition given their social capital, fear of 
victimization, and to avoid turf wars. Marie relocated from Glasgow to a rural village in the south of 
Scotland based on a combination of all three reasons. Yet while Marie’s criminal gang supplies drugs 
from her village to other local surrounding 
  
 
villages, she likewise retains supply lines into Glasgow via her younger male sibling who has a 
reputation for “being able to handle himself.” Similar practices were observed in Liverpool: 
 
I moved away because [I had] too much beef with everyone, like round by ours [Liverpool] all these 
kids just started moving round n that . . . I got caught on me own by like 6 kids, it was heavy . . . they 
tried to cut me init but it never worked, like it grazed me back you know what I mean, me coat was 
everywhere, I was running home n I had no feathers in me coat or nothing. It was heavy. (Elliot, 
Liverpool) 
 
However, it is important to note that “going country” was not always about avoiding fierce 
competition with perceived “dangerous gangs.” Rather, commuting was also about maximizing 
profits, whereby locally successful drug dealers extended their lines of supply. The rapid growth of 
drugs markets consequently coincided with not only a change in supply processes, but also the 
demise of traditional criminal structures. Owing to market forces, but also dedicated law 
enforcement action, respondents argued that the influence of traditional family-based criminal 
gangs had declined in Glasgow and Merseyside. As a result, a more diverse mix of younger, socially-
based, but still profit-driven, criminal groupings have emerged to compete for profits (see Densley et 
al., 2018; Pearson & Hobbs, 2001; Pitts, 2008). 
County Lines require a large pool of younger “runners” to transport and sell illicit drugs. As such, our 
findings are consistent with a large body of research documenting the articulated structure of drug-
dealing gangs in Britain (e.g., Densley, 2012; Harding, 2014; Pitts, 2008). Also consistent with this 
work was the unequal relationships between those who undertake street labour and those who 
organize it (McSweeney  et al., 2008)—the fact that the runners assumed a lot of the risk associated 
with drug dealing, but received very little reward. For example, one Merseyside participant was sent 
from Sefton to Cardiff for 2 weeks to sell cocaine and heroin, on the promise of receiving “a grand a 
week.” Not only did he not receive this money, but while there, he was arrested by an undercover 
police officer posing as a drug user. He explained how he was first transported from his hometown 
to the new drug supply base: 
 
The person who I was doing it for picked me and me mates up from Liverpool and we just drove 
there at night with like five ounces of heroin plugged . . . the person you do it for answers the phone 
and we were just going out to serve the smackheads [drug addicts]. (Smurf, Sefton) 
 
Smurf here described the mobile phone “line” of clients he worked at the direction of his “elder” 
(Densley, 2014; Pitts, 2008). Rather than pay him a fair wage or cut of the profits, however, his elder 
simply made sure he was “looked after” and his immediate needs were met. Elliot had a similar 
experience: 
 
One of the older kids just said . . . do you wana make some proper money and I was like yeah, [he] 
just started sending me to all mad places all over the country . . . every few days [he’d] bring me 
more stuff like some weed, a fucking, change of clothes . . . they’d  
always give me shower gel . . . new socks and boxies [underwear] and stuff like that. (Elliot, 
Liverpool) 
 
It is important to note that every single participant in the Merseyside study engaged in normalised 
cannabis consumption. It soon became apparent that, among other things, this was the hook used 
by criminal gangs to entice young people into selling drugs on their behalf. We did not find evidence 
of people involved in drug distribution solely to profit from “free drugs,” as opposed to monetary 
profit per se. Instead, the vast majority of participants were dealing drugs to pay off drug debts that 
dealers had allowed them to accrue over a long period of time—a form of indentured servitude. One 
Merseyside participant discussed the process known as “strapping” or “on tick,” which enables 
young people to have drugs upfront without paying for them, mirroring a buy now and pay later 
scheme: 
 
All in all I owe them [drug dealers] about 12 hundred quid . . . I was just strapping it off them . . . they 
won’t case [hassle] you, they’ve got dough, but if it’s been ages and they see you they’ll give you a 
little slap (kick your head in). (Smurf, Sefton) 
 
Most young people in the Merseyside study owed something to a drug dealer. Debt, they argued, 
represented a specific realm of risk for any drug dealer. It was a causal factor in violence, with some 
respondents describing episodes of drug debt–related kidnapping, sexual violence, and torture. But 
because dealers utilised debt as a form of coerced recruitment into the trade (i.e., those who had 
accrued small debts were asked to sell drugs to pay them off), it was also an essential part of what 
made working the County Lines appealing. 
 
Working the Lines 
While HM Government (2018), along with a growing number of scholars (e.g., Coomber & Moyle, 
2018), recognises the problem of County Lines, little information currently exists about exactly how 
it is organised and what local and regional variations exist. While the participants at the English site 
labelled such behaviour as “out there” or “trap- ping,” for example, in Scotland “going country” 
remained somewhat undefined: 
 
I call it trappin yeah, like I’ve never heard it being called “going country” or “county lines” . . . but like 
I’ve heard it getting called OT [out there] or cunch . . . like country but cunch, fields, OT, out the way, 
trappin, in the bando (abandoned house) . . . a bando is where all the shit gets sold, that’s where it 
comes from, but OT . . . or trappin [is the most used]. (Elliot, Liverpool) 
 
Years ago the suburban areas around Glasgow used to be quite nice and all . . . it is not like that 
nowadays. Bishopbriggs, Giffnock, [Newton] Merons, them places, well they are just like most places 
in Glasgow now. All the same. . . . Well known [criminals/ criminal groups] from the rough areas 
send young boys out to them places to supply to youths to sell. (Clair, Glasgow) 
  
 
Merseyside practitioners were far more in tune with the national and political dis- course around 
County Lines (e.g., HM Government, 2018) than their Scottish counter- parts, for example: 
 
County lines is where organised criminals . . . identify a vulnerable person [drug user] outside of the 
area, they’ll cuckoo them . . . they’ll give that person cannabis, cocaine, whatever and say right 
you’ve got £300 debt and you’ve got no means to pay that so the only way you’re gonna pay that is 
by offering them the opportunity to use [their] house, so then they’ll [drug dealers] move in, so 
you’ve got your organised criminal, runner, cuckoo, nest formation . . . vulnerables [young people] 
and [that is] your network. (Chief Superintendent, Merseyside Police) 
 
Among the Scottish sample, however, there was acknowledgment that activity consistent with the 
County Lines label was occurring. Participants recognised that there was considerable profit to be 
made from exploiting the west of Scotland’s disproportionate access to illegal drugs (see Densley et 
al., 2018; McLean et al., 2018).1 Several participants spoke about travelling, either themselves or 
other gang members, to smaller urban towns and villages with intent to supply drugs. 
In contrast to English studies that find seaside “holiday” resorts and other popular tourist 
destinations specifically targeted by drugs gangs (e.g., Coomber & Moyle, 2018), the Scottish sample 
practiced County Lines in far more isolated and recluse areas. Marie explained, 
 
Good down here. Quiet so no much people giving any hassle. Hardly any Police as well 
. . . [and] loads a wee villages about . . . I get [male gang members X & Z] to do [reconnaissance] . . . 
basically scope the place first and if it is cool then they start dealing. 
. . . in the town centre, [via local] users. . . . [they] get the users to start selling for [them]. (Marie, 
Glasgow) 
 
When asked how County Lines were first established, Marie continued, 
 
[Male gang member X] is bold. He just asks [the user] to let him stash gear in their house and sell 
from there . . . [he then] puts a set up in their house. They sell, and [he] collects every other day . . . 
they get an allowance (free drugs for personal use) from what we put there [to reduce] bumping us. 
(Marie, Glasgow) 
 
Dealing in smaller, more rural areas meant there was a reduced police presence and an ability to 
impose dominance over local dealers, motivations consistent with existing County Lines theory (HM 
Government, 2018), yet violence was still known to erupt in commuter areas because other criminal 
groups practicing County Lines would simultaneously arrive in the market.2 One Police participant 
indicated that Merseyside gangs were in dispute with each other in county locations over drug 
territory: 
 
[We] had a murder in Shrewsbury which was a Sefton nominal . . . 17 years of age . . . got murdered 
by Speke nominals, so it was getting played out in a council estate in Shrewsbury, two organised 
crime groups all fighting for the same patch, the reason why it’s happening in those county locations 
is because there isn’t a recognised criminal gang structure in there so organised crime groups come 
in and basically terrorise the local criminals, they’ve never [before] seen the level of violence . . . 
they’re scared stiff so they comply cause they just think woah, never seen anything like this. 
(Detective Superintendent, Merseyside Police) 
Steve from Glasgow provided another example: 
 
We were selling to young boys from [village A] . . . so fucking was [rival gang]. Fuck that, they cunts, 
trying to mussel in aye, no, no, no chance. . . . I went and seen the boys [from village A], personally, 
got them told “you get them cunts selling for [rival gang] stabbed, I don’t care who the fuck it is, 
even if its your maw (mum)” . . . the lads did well, a heavy barney (fight) went down, they did well. 
(Steve, Glasgow) 
 
To overcome fierce competition for often small patches of drug territory, respondents said that 
young runners often had to use their initiative. Elliot from Liverpool continued, 
 
I was the best in Stoke yeah I never just stayed in the house, I used to get out there, some of them 
[runners] just stay in the house and wait for a phone call but I’d get out there and like, wanna get 
known round there and let everyone know that I was dealing and make more money for the boss, 
and more money for meself as well you know what I mean. (Elliot, Liverpool) 
 
As explored in the following section, however, the exploitation of children and vulnerable drug users 
was a necessary aspect of innovation in County Lines activity. Drug dealers needed a number of 
young people at their disposal to transport and sell drugs and required the homes of vulnerable drug 
users in their newly established drug markets as sites to store and retail drugs. 
 
Exploitation 
The descriptions of County Lines provided by respondents very much highlighted exploitative 
processes such as marginalised children and young people, drug addicts, and women, selling drugs, 
often from their own homes, on behalf of more powerful criminal gangs from the major cities. This 
dynamic allowed the real criminals to remain largely hidden from law enforcement and even other 
rival drugs gangs, there- fore being able to conduct covert drug wars in satellite areas. Thus, should 
their local representatives be arrested, the criminal gang could simply cut ties and relocate. Similarly, 
should their runners miss a payment (or be “light” on a payment), have their goods stolen, or build 
bad debts, then the criminal gang supplying the drugs could impose itself upon the runners and 
demand payment. Marie explains the process of collecting bad debts from those who have their 
homes taken over for use as traphouses (known as “cuckooing,” see Coomber & Moyle, 2018). 
  
Don’t get me wrong, they do come up short sometimes . . . am no that harsh, give a warning. [Sibling 
A] might tax them but, know like interest. Fuck, even puts the girls out to work if it’s a good bit . . 
.only till debts paid . . . wouldn’t do that to like anyone, but [they are] smackheads (heroin addicts) . . 
. its nothing to them. (Marie, Glasgow) 
 
Marie notes how “it’s nothing” for some drug dealers and users to “puts [sic] the girls out to work,” 
which is a reference to forced prostitution. As a woman, Marie said she “wouldn’t do that,” but the 
implication here, as in other interviews, was that County Lines drug dealing and sexual exploitation 
were linked. 
Furthermore, Elliot describes how gangs leverage drug addiction to secure compliance from home 
owners: 
 
Sometimes they ask for more and you’ve gotta be straight and say nah you’re not getting no more . . 
. I give them [heroin addicts] three bits (heroin and crack) for 24 hours you know what I mean, his 
house is mine. (Elliot, Liverpool) 
 
Vulnerable drug users find themselves in an impossible situation. Their addiction to drugs makes it 
easy for criminal gangs to exert power and control, manipulating the drug user to believe that they 
are getting a good deal. Some dealers exchange drugs for sex or coerce users into other dangerous 
and humiliating acts. Elliot continued, 
 
I’ve been asked by a man before like and I’ve just terrored [sic] him and said “nah lad I’m not gay lad 
fuck off, go and lash your boyfriend” . . . I’ve done it with girls ‘n that, I’ve been bought. This one 
crackhead . . . said “I’ll give you a suck for a bit yeah” and I’ve said “nah fuck off, leg it,” or “I’ll give 
ya two bits (drugs) yeah if you eat that ash tray” and he’s eaten it . . . some crackheads are funny 
though . . . I made this crackhead eat shit ‘n that for rocks . . . I was like look I’ll pay ya 3 bits to do it . 
. . and he picked shit up with his hand and ate it. (Elliot, Liverpool) 
 
Beyond coercion into sex or self-harm, vulnerable drug users can be held hostage in their own 
homes and, in some cases, forced into temporarily giving up their homes so that gangs can set up 
shop there. Later, it is young people themselves who are the victims, when they commute in from 
their home towns to sell drugs in a stranger’s home: 
 
[Organised criminals think] “I know there’s an opportunity to deal drugs and I know there’s a drugs 
market, I don’t wana go and live in Bournemouth, I wanna stay in Croxteth [Liverpool], but I want 
money so how am I gonna do that? You know what, I’m gonna get him to do it and pay them very 
little”, or “I’m gonna pay them nothing cause I’m gonna threaten them to do it and they’re gonna 
live down in Bournemouth in a drug dealers house, or a drug users house, and I’m gonna threaten 
them as well and I’m gonna use violence to say he’s coming to live in your house and you can’t do 
anything about it cause if you do I’ll cut your leg off.” (Detective Superintendent, Merseyside Police) 
 
Interviewees observed how drug dealers’ initial promises soon turned into threats and in some 
cases, drug sellers were physically locked in premises so they were unable to escape. Some sellers 
were even monitored by their bosses using mobile phone location apps or random video calls to 
check on their whereabouts. 
Exploitation was a key feature of County Lines when described by practitioners such as Clair: 
 
[I’ve] been in this job too long . . . definitely, I think there has been clear changes [with gang 
organisation] . . . older gang members will use kids to like [carry] their drugs for them and take them 
here, there, and everywhere . . . [be]cause underagers [sic] can’t get a criminal record . . . Criminals 
just work the system don’t they. (Clair, Glasgow). 
 
However, “exploitation” was practitioner terminology, a variation on “gang talk” (Hallsworth & 
Young, 2008). The challenge with any form of exploitation is that the victims seldom see themselves 
as such. Exploitation was something that happened to others, especially from the perspective of 
those doing the exploiting. Unlike CSE, the victims of CCE were mostly male. In an attempt to uphold 
their perceived masculine status, young male respondents routinely rejected the victim label to 
profess that drug dealing was their own (rational) choice. The Merseyside participants acknowledged 
they were being “used” to some extent, but they also spoke favourably of going “out there.” 
Regardless of the risk of violence, danger, and contact with the criminal justice system, many young 
people claimed that working County Lines was easy and highly lucrative. Participants in the 
Merseyside study questioned where else they would be able to make large amounts of money 
considering their age and lack of academic achievement. 
 
What job are you gonna get paid 330 pound every two days, grand a week basically, more, it’s easy . 
. . you gotta train for 20 years . . . when you can just become a crack dealer like that [clicks fingers]. 
(Smurf, Sefton) 
 
In Glasgow, due to comparable experiences of social and economic marginalisation, and a perceived 
limited access to otherwise legitimate work, drug dealing was described as the only way in which 
youth could feel successful in society—a common theme among research in this area (e.g., Densley 
& Stevens, 2015). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article examined the organisation of County Lines drug dealing and gave voice to the emotional, 
physical, and social harms experienced by County Lines labourers, namely children. It moved the 
literature beyond London and surrounding communities (e.g., Coomber & Moyle, 2018) to provide a 
broader picture of the practice of illicit drug dealing in Britain. While the phenomenon identified by 
police as County Lines is perhaps underdeveloped in Glasgow and Liverpool compared with London, 
our findings confirm that County Lines still enable criminal gangs to maximise profits and reduce 
their risk of being caught by police. How County Lines present may differ slightly depending on the 
site in which they are examined, but in Merseyside and Glasgow, as in London, County Lines involve 
criminal groups establishing a network between an urban hub and a county location, into which 
drugs are supplied (NCA, 2017). And vulnerable populations, including children under the age of 18, 
are used to travel between the urban hub and the new drug market to supply drugs for little reward. 
The current study further provided new insights into the underexplored area of exploitation of 
vulnerable peoples by illicit enterprises (e.g., Atkinson-Sheppard, 2015). Prior research has found 
criminal gangs identify young people whom they think will make good drug dealers, and the ease of 
exploiting these young people lies heavily within socioeconomic disadvantage (for a review, see 
Densley, 2018). Through conspicuous consumption and impression management both in person and 
on social media, gang members are able to display the glamourous aspects of their lifestyle (Harding, 
2014; Storrod & Densley, 2017). Such is the attraction of this lifestyle, that young people admire 
gang members and aspire to be like them. For young people with little belief in their future 
prospects, making fast money becomes a personal priority that criminal gangs can exploit. It binds 
them to a wide range of imaginable horrors that come with the territory, from exposure to 
normalised heroin and crack cocaine use, to risky sexual activity (Briggs, 2010). 
County Lines cross traditional police force boundaries; therefore, any response must bring law 
enforcement together to ensure intelligence and information are shared and the links with criminal 
exploitation and illegal drugs markets are identified (NCA, 2017). At the same time, tackling the root 
causes of gang culture and its implications for drug distribution involves more than a reactive law 
enforcement response; that is, a movement toward a wider justice policy rhetoric focused on 
tackling social and economic marginalisation. Doing so will involve putting local people and 
communities at the heart of decision-making through a focus on co-production of ideas for 
addressing these issues. Our findings suggest some young people will justify or “neutralize” their 
exploitation (Sykes & Matza, 1957); therefore, a communication strategy is needed to raise 
awareness of the unequal power dynamic at the heart of County Lines, to educate people that the 
receipt of something in return for something does not make the young person or vulnerable adult 
any less of a victim. 
Moreover, the way in which policies for tackling gangs and drug markets are conceptualised and 
applied needs to take cognisance of the nature and impact of gang activity in local settings. Our 
insights suggest that the undisputed allure of the drug market in stimulating gang “evolution” into 
County Lines has implications for wider drug policy (Densley, 2014; McLean, 2018). The view that 
prohibition and drug enforcement can be effective in preventing problem drug use is widespread 
across the Western world, but it has been argued that drug laws—which tend to be driven by a 
moral view which valorises the currency of abstinence—often cause more harm than good (Stevens, 
2011). To truly prevent County Lines, the policy discourse in Britain may need to transition from a 
focus on prohibition to a focus on drug harm reduction and (in some cases) decriminalisation. 
  
 
Furthermore, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS, 2017) 
recently published a report about the policing response to modern slavery and human trafficking. 
The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, Kevin Hyland, used the opportunity to argue that using 
children to transport and sell illicit drugs in County Lines operations was a form of “modern-day 
slavery” (see Pepin, 2018). In the first case of its kind in the UK, two gang members running a County 
Line were recently convicted of human trafficking offences after exploiting a vulnerable woman to 
transport and sell drugs (Slawson, 2018). This would imply that there is potential to prosecute gangs 
engaged in County Lines operations under the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which under Section 2.1 
defines when “a person arranges or facilitates the travel of another person (‘V’) with a view to V 
being exploited” as “trafficking” and in Section 3 defines when “a person uses or attempts to use [a 
child] (a) to provide services of any kind, (b) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or 
(c) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind” as “exploitation” (see Dent, 2017). At 
the same time, however, statutory safeguarding processes and multiagency support are needed to 
protect and prevent harm to children at risk from criminal exploitation. 
It is important to recognise the small-scale nature of our research and therefore to be cautious 
about applicability claims. Additional research is needed to explore and examine emerging markets 
and distribution systems in more depth and thus provide a more nuanced picture of the localised 
realities of County Lines. However, findings here illuminate young people’s involvement in County 
Lines, and the dynamic operation of and emerging issues within drug markets in Britain. Given the 
unique insights emerging from the participant interviews, the research findings could hold the 
potential to more clearly inform policy-related discussion on the most effective means of policing 
County Lines and preventing CCE (HM Government, 2018). 
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Notes 
1. The Scottish Serious Organised Crime Strategy (Scottish Government, 2015) acknowledges 
that the West of Scotland retains around 70% of the countries organised crime, over 60% of which is 
directly related to the illicit supply of drugs, in which over 300 Serious Organised Crime Groups 
operate. 
2. See BBC (2015) for report of shooting in Duddingston, Edinburgh, involving gang members 
operating along extended county lines, originating in London. 
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